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Recent work has revealed a new class of “zero-determinant” (ZD) strategies for iterated,
two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship
between her score and her opponent’s score, and thus achieve an unusual degree of con-
trol over both players’ long-term payoffs. Although originally conceived in the context of
classical, two-player game theory, ZD strategies also have consequences in evolving pop-
ulations of players. Here we explore the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). Several recent studies have focused on the evolution
of “extortion strategies” – a subset of zero-determinant strategies – and found them to be
unsuccessful in populations. Nevertheless, we identify a different subset of ZD strategies,
called “generous ZD strategies,” that forgive defecting opponents, but nonetheless dominate
in evolving populations. For all but the smallest population sizes, generous ZD strategies
are not only robust to being replaced by other strategies, but they also can selectively re-
place any non-cooperative ZD strategy. Generous strategies can be generalized beyond the
space of ZD strategies, and they remain robust to invasion. When evolution occurs on the
full set of all IPD strategies, selection disproportionately favors these generous strategies.
In some regimes, generous strategies outperform even the most successful of the well-known
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies, including win-stay-lose-shift.
Introduction
Press and Dyson [1] recently revealed a remarkable class of strategies, called “zero-determinant” (ZD)
strategies, for iterated two-player games. ZD strategies are of particular interest in the Iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (IPD), the canonical game used to study the emergence of cooperation among rational
individuals [2–9]. By allowing a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her payoff
and her opponent’s payoff, Press and Dyson argue, ZD strategies provide a sentient player unprecedented
control over the longterm outcome of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In particular, Press and Dyson
highlighted a subset of ZD strategies, called “extortion strategies,” that grant the extorting player a
disproportionately high payoff when employed against a naive opponent who blindly adjusts his strategy
to maximize his own payoff.
A natural response to Press and Dyson is to ask: What are the implications of ZD strategies for an
evolving population of players [10]? Although several recent studies have begun to explore this question
[11,12], they have focused almost exclusively on extortion strategies. Extortion strategies are not successful
in evolving populations, unless the population size is very small. Like all strategies that prefer to defect
rather than to cooperate, extortion strategies are vulnerable to strategies that reward cooperation but
punish defection. However, there is more to ZD strategies than just extortion, and recent work has
uncovered some ZD strategies that promote cooperation in two-player games [10, 13]. Here we consider
the full range of ZD strategies in a population setting and show that, when it comes to evolutionary
success, it is generosity, not extortion, that rules.
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We begin our analysis by considering populations restricted to the space of ZD strategies. We show
that evolution within ZD always leads to a special subset of strategies, which we call generous ZD.
Generous ZD strategies reward cooperation, but punish defection only mildly, and they tend to score lower
payoffs than defecting opponents. Next, we build on recent work by Akin [13], who identified generous
strategies beyond those contained within ZD. We demonstrate that a large proportion of these generous
strategies are robust to replacement in an evolving population. The robust, generous strategies can at
worst be replaced neutrally. Conversely, we demonstrate that most generous strategies can readily replace
resident non-generous strategies in a population. As a result, generous strategies are just as, or sometimes
even more, successful than the most successful of well-known Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies in
evolving populations. Finally, we show that populations evolving on the full set of Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma strategies spend a disproportionate amount of time near generous strategies, indicating that
they are favored by evolution.
Methods and Results
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players X and Y must simultaneously choose whether to cooperate (c) or
defect (d). If both players cooperate (cc) then they each receive payoff R. If X cooperates and Y defects
(cd), then X loses out and receives the smallest possible payoff, S, while Y receives the largest possible
payoff, T . If both players defect (dd), then both players receive payoff P . Payoffs are specified so that
the reward for mutual defection is less than the reward for mutual cooperation, i.e. T > R > P > S. It is
typically assumed that 2R > T + S, so that it is not possible for total payoff received by both players to
exceed 2R. In what follows we will consider the payoffs T = B, R = B − C, P = 0 and S = −C, which
comprise the so-called “donation game” [12].
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) consists of infinitely many successive rounds of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Press and Dyson [1] showed that it is sufficient to consider only the space of memory-1 strategies,
i.e. strategies that specify the probability a player cooperates each round in terms of the payoff she
received in the previous round. Memory-1 strategies consist of four probabilities, p = {pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd}.
In particular, Press and Dyson [1] showed that the longterm payoff to a memory-1 player pitted against
an arbitrary opponent is the same as her payoff would be against some other, memory-1 opponent. Thus,
we limit our analysis to memory-1 players without loss of generality (see also Materials and Methods).
Evolutionary game theory
In the context of evolutionary game theory, we consider a population of N individuals each characterized
by a strategy p. We say strategy p receives longterm payoff pi(p,q) against an opponent with strategy
q. The success of a strategy depends on its payoff when pitted against all individuals in the population
[14–17]. Traditionally, the evolutionary outcome in such a population has been understood in terms of
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). A strategy p is an ESS if its longterm payoffs satisfy pi(p,p) >
pi(p,q), or pi(p,p) = pi(p,q) and pi(p,q) > pi(q,q), for all opponents q 6= p.
The ESS condition provides a useful notion of stability in the context of an infinite population.
However, in a finite population, the concept must be generalized to consider whether selection favors both
invasion and replacement of a resident strategy by a mutant strategy [18, 19]. In a finite, homogenous
population of size N , a newly introduced neutral mutation (i.e. a mutation that does not change the payoff
to either player) will eventually replace the entire population with probability ρ = 1/N . A deleterious
mutation, which is opposed by selection, will fix with probability ρ < 1/N ; while an advantageous
mutation, which is favored by selection, will fix with probability ρ > 1/N . We say that a resident
strategy p in a finite population of size N is evolutionary robust against a mutant strategy q if the
probability of replacement satisfies ρ ≤ 1/N ; in other words, the robust strategy cannot be selectively
replaced by the mutant strategy. In the limit of infinite population size, N →∞, the condition ρ < 1/N
reduces to the ESS condition.
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When selection is weak (σ  1), we can write down an explicit criterion for robustness: a resident Y
is evolutionary robust against a mutant X if and only if (see Materials and Methods and [18,19])
sxx(N − 2) + sxy(2N − 1) ≤ syx(N + 1) + 2syy(N − 2), (1)
where we denote the longterm payoff of player X against player Y by sxy. We restrict our analysis to
memory-1 players. In the two-player setting this restriction does not sacrifice generality, because, as per
Press & Dyson [1], the payoff received by a memory-1 strategy Y can be determined independently of
her opponent’s memory. However, in an evolutionary setting, Y ’s success depends also on the payoff
her opponent receives against himself. Nonetheless we will show that our results for generous strategies
hold against all opponents, no matter how long their memories, provided the standard IPD assumption
2R > T + S holds.
Zero-determinant strategies, extortion, and generosity
Among the space of all memory-1 IPD strategies, Press and Dyson identified a subspace of so-called
“zero-determinant” (ZD) strategies that ensure a fixed, linear relationship between two players’ longterm
payoffs. If player Y facing player X employs a ZD strategy of the form
pcc = 1− φ(1− χ)(B − C − κ)
pdc = 1− φ [χC +B − (1− χ)κ]
pcd = φ [χB + C + (1− χ)κ]
pdd = φ(1− χ)κ,
then their payoffs will satisfy the linear relationship
φ [sxy − χsyx − (1− χ)κ] = 0. (2)
The parameters χ and κ must lie in the range 0 ≤ κ ≤< B−C and max
(
κ−B
κ+C ,
κ+C
κ−B
)
≤ χ ≤ 1 to produce
a feasible strategy. Eq. 2 defines the full space of ZD strategies introduced by Press & Dyson [1]. Within
this space, two particular subsets are of special interest: the extortion strategies, described by Press &
Dyson, for which κ = P = 0 and χ > 0, and the generous strategies, described in our commentary [10],
for which κ = R = B − C and χ > 0.
Extortion strategies ensure that either the extortioner Y receives a higher payoff than her opponent X,
syx > sxy, or otherwise both players receive the payoff for mutual defection, syx = sxy = 0. In contrast,
generous strategies ensure that both players receive the payoff for mutual cooperation, syx = sxy = B−C,
or otherwise the generous player Y receives a lower payoff than her opponent, syx < sxy.
Recent work has focused on the evolutionary prospects of extortioners [11, 12], and found that such
strategies are unsuccessful, except in very small populations. In fact, as we will show below, selection favors
replacement of extortioners by generous strategies; whereas generous strategies are robust to replacement
by extortioners. Moreover, the success of generous strategies persists when evolution proceeds within the
full space IPD strategies.
Evolution of generosity within ZD strategies
We start by identifying the subset of ZD strategies that are evolutionary robust against all IPD strategies
in a population of size N . Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 shows that a resident ZD strategy Y with
κy = B − C is robust against any mutant IPD strategy X if and only if χy ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1) (see
Materials and Methods). Conversely, provided N > 2, any resident ZD strategy Y with κy < B − C
can be selectively replaced by another strategy – namely, by a ZD strategy with κx = B − C and
χx > (N + 1)/(2N − 1) (see Materials and Methods). Hence, those ZD strategies with κ = B − C
and χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1) are precisely the ZD strategies that are evolutionary robust against all IPD
strategies. We denote this set of robust ZD strategies as ZDR:
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ZDR =
{
(κ, χ, φ)|κ = B − C, 1 > χ ≥ N+12N−1
}
.
Here φ is left unconstrained, but it must lie in the range required to produce a feasible strategy, 0 < φ ≤
χB/(χC +B).
The robust ZD strategies are what we call cooperative, meaning they satisfy κ = B−C. Any cooperative
player will agree to mutual cooperation when facing another cooperative player, and so they each receive
payoff B−C. If a cooperative strategy further satisfies the condition χ > 0 then we say that the strategy
is generous – meaning that any deviation from mutual cooperation causes the generous player’s payoff to
decline more than that of her opponent. The robust ZD strategies are all generous.
We now consider evolution in a population of N > 2 players restricted to the space of ZD strategies.
Because selection favors replacement of any non-cooperative ZD strategy by some member of ZDR, we
expect evolution within the space of ZD strategies to tend towards generous strategies – and thereafter
to remain at generous strategies, because ZDR is robust. This expectation is confirmed by Monte-Carlo
simulations of well-mixed populations of IPD players (Fig. 1). Following [12,20], we modeled evolution as
a process in which individuals copy successful strategies with a probability that depends on their relative
payoffs (see Materials and Methods). As Fig. 1 shows, evolution within the set of ZD strategies proceeds
from extortion (κ = 0 and χ > 0) to generosity (κ = B−C and χ > 0). In fact, even populations initiated
with χ < 0 evolve to generosity (Fig. S1).
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Figure 1: Evolution from extortion to generosity within the space of ZD strategies. Populations were simulated
in the regime of weak mutation. The figure shows the ensemble mean value of κ in the population, plotted over
time. κ = 0 corresponds to the extortion strategies of Press & Dyson, whereas κ = B − C corresponds to the
generous ZD strategies. Each population was initialised at an extortion strategy Eχ, with χ drawn uniformly from
the range χ ∈ (0, 1]. Given a resident strategy in the population, mutations to κ were proposed as normal deviates
of the resident strategy, truncated to constrain κ ∈ [0, B − C], while mutations to {χ, φ} were drawn uniformly
from max
(
κ−B
κ+C ,
κ+C
κ−B
)
≤ χ ≤ 1 with φ drawn uniformly within the feasible range given κ and χ. A proposed
mutant strategy replaces the resident strategy with a fixation probability dependent on their respective payoffs, as
in [12, 20]. The mean κ among 103 replicate populations is plotted as a function of time. Parameters are B = 3,
C = 1, N = 100, and selection strength σ = 1.
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Good strategies
The generous ZD strategies identified above are best understood by comparison with the space of good
strategies recently introduced by Akin [13]. A good strategy stabilizes cooperative behavior in the two-
player IPD: by defintion, if both players adopt good strategies then each receives payoff B − C and
neither player can gain by unilaterally changing strategy. All good strategies are cooperative, i.e. they
have κ = B − C. Moreover, the generous ZD strategies described above are precisely the intersection of
good strategies [13] and ZD strategies [1] (Fig. 2).
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies 
Good 
strategies 
Extortion strategies 
ZD 
strategies 
Generous ZD 
Strategies  
Evolutionary robust 
strategies 
Win-stay-lose-shift 
Generous 
Tit-for-tat 
Tit-for-tat 
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Figure 2: The relationship between ZD and good strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The intersection
between ZD and good is precisely the set of generous ZD strategies. Not all good strategies are generous. As
a result, only a strict subset of good strategies are evolutionary robust, just as a strict subset of ZD strategies
are evolutionary robust. Extortion strategies are neither generous nor evolutionary robust. Also shown are the
locations of the classical IPD strategies [19] win-stay-lose-shift, tit-for-tat, and generous tit-for-tat.
We can identify the space of memory-1 good strategies as those of the form
pcc = 1− φ(1− χ)(B − C − κ)
pdc = 1− φ [χC +B − (1− χ)κ+ λ]
pcd = φ [χB + C + (1− χ)κ− λ]
pdd = φ(1− χ)κ,
where −1 ≤ χ ≤ 1 and −(χB+C) ≤ λ ≤ (B+χC) are required to produce a feasible strategy. Sufficient
conditions for set G of good strategies are (see Supporting Information)
G = {(κ, χ, φ, λ)|
κ = B − C, λ > −(B − C)χ, λ > −(B + C)χ} ,
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where the parameter φ is left unconstrained except that it must produce a feasible strategy. Numerics
indicate these sufficient conditions are also neccesary (see Supporting Information). Note that the good
strategies with λ = 0 correspond precisely to the generous ZD strategies.
It is interesting to note that, in addition to tit-for-tat and generous tit-for-tat, which are ZD, the set
of good strategies also contains win-lose-stay-shift, which is widely known as one of the most evolutionary
successful IPD strategies [7]. Nonetheless, even though win-lose-stay-shift is good, it is not generous (it
has χ = −C/B < 0, Fig. 3). Because it lacks generosity, win-lose-stay-shift can in fact be out-competed
in evolving populations, as we shall see below.
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Figure 3: The space of all cooperative IPD strategies, projected onto the parameters χ and λ. The boundary of the
simplex delineates the set of feasible strategies with κ = B−C. Strategies colored light blue or dark blue are good ;
whereas strategies colored dark blue are both good and evolutionary robust, under weak selection. Setting λ = 0
recovers the space of cooperative ZD strategies (red line). Note that all robust strategies are generous (i.e. χ > 0
and κ = B − C). Each point in the figure, {χ, λ}, has an associated range of φ values, and thus corresponds to
multiple IPD strategies. However, the evolutionary robust good strategies resist replacement by any other strategy,
regardless of the choice of φ. The figure illustrates the robust region for a large population size; whereas Eq. 3 gives
the exact N -dependent conditions for robustness. Also shown are the locations of several classical IPD strategies.
Tit-for-tat (χ = 1) and generous tit-for-tat (χ = 0) are limiting cases of generous ZD strategies, but they are not
robust. Likewise, win-stay-lose-shift is good but not robust.
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Evolutionary of generosity within good strategies
In this section we ask which good strategies are evolutionary robust; and we find that the robust good
strategies are always generous – i.e. have χ > 0, regardless of λ. In the case of ZD, the conditions for
evolutionary robustness do not depend on the parameter φ. Similarly, we will derive conditions for the
robustness of good strategies that hold regardless of φ.
Application of Eq. 1 allows us to derive the conditions for a good strategy to be evolutionary robust
against all IPD strategies in a population of size N (see Supporting Information). The resulting set, GR,
of evolutionary robust good strategies satisfies
GR =
{
(κ, χ, φ, λ)|κ = B − C,χ < 1,
λ >
B − C
3N
[N + 1− (2N − 1)χ] ,
λ >
B + C
N − 2 [N + 1− (2N − 1)χ]
}
. (3)
Here φ is left unconstrained except that it must produce a feasible strategy. These analytical conditions
for robustness are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S2). Setting λ = 0 in the equation above
recovers the conditions we previously derived for the robustness of ZD strategies. As in the case of ZD,
the robust good strategies are exclusively limited to generous strategies (i.e. strategies with κ = B − C
and χ > 0, see Fig. 3).
Interestingly, the strategy win-stay-lose-shift does not lie within the region of robust good strategies
(Fig. 3). As a concrete demonstration of this result we have identified a specific strategy that selectively
replaces win-lose-stay-shift in a finite population (see Supporting Information and Fig. S3). Furthermore,
even under strong selection, and under increased mutation rates, win-stay-lose-shift can be dominated by
some strategies (Fig. S3).
The evolutionary success of generosity
We have shown that generous strategies are evolutionarily robust and eventually dominate in a population,
when players are confined to the space of ZD strategies. We have also shown that amongst the good
strategies, which stabilize cooperative behavior, the evolutionary robust strategies, GR, are also generous.
To complement these results, we now systematically query the evolutionary success of generous strategies
in general, by allowing a population to explore the full set of memory-1 strategies p = {pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd}
and quantifying how much time the population spends near generosity.
Following [12, 21], we performed simulations in the regime of weak mutation, so that the population
is monomorphic for a single strategy at all times. Mutant strategies, drawn uniformly from the space
{pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd}, are proposed at rate µ. A proposed mutant either immediately fixes or is immediately
lost from the population, according to its fixation probability calculated relative to the current strategy
in the population [12,20]. Over the course of this simulation we quantified how much time the population
spends in a δ-neighborhood of ZD, ZDR, G, and GR strategies, as well as extortion strategies (Fig. 4).
The δ-neighborhood of a strategy set is defined as those strategies within Euclidean distance δ of it, among
the space of all memory-1 strategies. If the proportion of time spent in the δ-neighborhood is greater
than would be expected by random chance (which is proportional to the volume of the δ-neighborhood),
then evolution is said to favor that set of strategies.
It is already known that, except for very small populations, a population spends far less time near
extortion strategies than expected by random chance, and that the same is true for the set of all ZD
strategies [11,12]. Thus, extortion and ZD strategies in general are disfavored by evolution in populations.
This has led to the view the ZD strategies are of importance only in the setting of classical two-player
game theory, and not in evolving populations [22]. However, in Fig. 4 we repeat this analysis but we
additionally report the δ-neighborhoods of ZDR, G, and GR strategies. We find that, except in very
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small populations, selection strongly favors G, GR, and, especially, ZDR strategies. In particular, the
population spends more than 100-times longer in the neighborhood of ZDR strategies than expected by
random chance. Thus, ZD contains a subset of strategies that are remarkably successful in evolving
populations.
We also analyzed the time spent near each individual good strategy, under both weak and strong
selection. We found that the strategies most strongly favored by selection are virtually all generous
(Fig. S4). The remaining good strategies are typically moderately favored by selection, with the exception
of those near win-stay-lose-shift, which are also strongly favored.
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Figure 4: Generous strategies are favored by selection in evolving populations. We simulated a population under
weak mutation, proposing mutant strategies drawn uniformly from the full set of memory-1 IPD strategies. We
calculated the time spent in the δ-neighborhood [12] of ZD and extortion strategies, as well as robust ZD strategies,
good strategies and robust good strategies, relative to their random (neutral) expectation. For small population sizes,
extortioners are abundant and generous strategies are nearly absent. As population size increases, the frequency
of generous strategies and good strategies is strongly amplified by selection; whereas extortion strategies, and ZD
strategies in general, are disfavored, as previously reported [12]. Simulations were run until the population fixed
107 mutations. Parameters are B = 3, C = 1, δ = 0.05, and selection strength Nσ = 100.
The success of generous strategies against classic IPD strategies
To complement the weak-mutation studies described above, we also compared the performance of generous
ZD strategies against several classic IPD strategies, in a finite population of players [12,18–20], assuming
either strong or weak mutation (i.e. high or low mutation rates). We performed Monte-Carlo simulations
of populations constrained to different subsets of strategies, similar to those of [12]. In these simulations,
a pair of individuals is chosen from the population at each time step, and the first individual copies the
strategy of the second with a probability that depends on their respective payoffs, as above. Mutations
also occur, with probability µ, so that the mutated individual randomly adopts another strategy from
the set of strategies being considered. We ran simulations at a variety of populations sizes, ranging from
8
from N = 2 to N = 1, 000.
At very small population sizes, defector strategies tend to dominate (Fig. S5), reflecting the fact
that extortion pays in the classic two-player setting [1]. However, as the population size increases, good
strategies, such as win-stay-lose-shift, and generous ZD quickly begin to dominate (Fig. S5). Which
strategy does best depends on the population size, the mutation rate, and the set of available strategies
(Figs. S5-S6). In some regimes generous ZD strategies outperform even win-stay-lose-shift (Fig. S5).
Discussion
We have shown that generous strategies tend to dominate in evolving populations of IPD players. This
is a surprising result because, when faced with a defector strategy, generous strategies must by definition
suffer a greater reduction in payoff than their opponent suffers. And so one might expect such strategies
to be vulnerable to replacement by defector strategies – whereas in fact, we have shown, the reverse is
true. Likewise, one might expect generous strategies to be unsuccessful at displacing resident strategies
in a population. However, simulations reveal (Figs. S7-S8) that most generous strategies can selectively
replace almost all other IPD strategies.
How can we account for the remarkable evolutionary success of generosity? First, it is important to
note that the most successful generous strategies are not too generous. For example, in a large population,
evolutionary robust ZD strategies must have χ > 1/2: that is, they must reduce their payoff when faced
with a defector opponent, but not by too much. Second, whilst generous strategies score less than defector
strategies in head-to-head matches, they are able to limit the difference between their own payoff and their
opponent’s payoff (see Materials and Methods). As a result, they tend to have a consistent probability
ρ > 1/N of replacing a diversity of resident IPD strategies (Fig. S8), allowing them to succeed in an
evolutionary setting.
We found that generous ZD strategies are particularly successful when mutations arise at an appre-
ciable rate. Under such circumstances, ZDR strategies can dominate even win-stay-lose-shift, a perennial
favourite in evolving populations [7, 11,23,24]. Over all, selection strongly favors generous ZD strategies
when evolution proceeds in the full space of memory-1 strategies. These results strongly contravene the
view that ZD strategies are of little evolutionary importance [22]. In fact, we have shown that a subset
of ZD strategies, the generous ones, are strongly favored in the evolutionary setting.
The discovery and elegant definition of ZD strategies remains a remarkable achievement, especially in
light of decades worth of prior research on the Prisoner’s Dilemma in both the two-player and evolutionary
settings. ZD strategies comprise a variety of new ways to play the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Akin’s
generalization of cooperative ZD to good strategies provides novel insight into how cooperation between
two rational players can be stabilized. However, in an evolutionary setting, amongst both ZD and good
strategies, it is the generous ones that are most successful.
Appendix
Notation: For ease of analysis, the parameter χ we use throughout is the inverse of that used by Press
& Dyson [1]. In addition, to avoid confusion with δ-neighborhoods, we use λ in place of Akin’s δ [13].
Evolutionary simulations
We simulated a well-mixed population in which selection follows an “imitation” process [12,20]. At each,
discrete time step, a pair of individuals (X,Y ) is chosen at random. X switches its strategy to imitate Y
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with probability fx→y,
fx→y =
1
1 + exp[σ(sx − sy)] ,
where sx and sy denote the average IPD payoffs of players X and Y against the entire population, and
σ denotes the strength of selection. When a mutant strategy X is introduced to a population otherwise
consisting of a resident strategy Y , its probability of fixation, ρ is given by
ρ =
1∑N−1
i=0
∏i
j=1 e
σ[(j−1)syy+(N−j)syx−jsxy−(N−j−1)sxx]
. (4)
Taylor expansion to first order about σ = 0 gives Eq. 1, the condition for selective replacement of Y by
X under weak selection.
Evolutionary robustness of cooperative ZD strategies
Suppose that a resident strategy Y is cooperative and ZD. We will show that Y is evolutionary robust
if and only if χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1). From Eq. 1 we deduce that Y is robust against any mutant IPD
strategy X iff their payoffs satisfy
sxy(2N − 1) ≤ syx(N + 1) + (B − C)(N − 2).
Using Eq. 2 to substitute for syx yields the equivalent condition
[(B − C)− sxy](χ(2N − 1)− (N + 1)) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, we know that B − C ≥ sxy for any mutant X (because, otherwise Eq. 2 would imply that
both syx and sxy exceed B−C, which contradicts the assumption 2R > T +S). Therefore the cooperative
ZD strategy Y is robust if and only if χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1).
Non-cooperative ZD strategies can be selectively replaced
Here we show that a resident ZD strategy Y with κy < B − C is selectively replaced by a ZD strategy
X with κx = B − C and χx > (N + 1)/(2N − 1). Since both players are ZD, their payoffs satisfy the
equations
χxsxy − χxκx = syx − κx
χysyx − χyκy = sxy − κy.
which result in the payoff matrix Substituting these payoffs into Eq. 1 shows that X can selectively
X Y
X κx
(1−χy)κy+χy(1−χx)κx
(1−χyχx)
Y
(1−χx)κx+χx(1−χy)κy
(1−χyχx) κy
replace Y iff
[(2(1− χx)(1 + χy −Nχy) + (1− χy)(1 + χx −Nχx)]× (5)
(κx − κy) < 0
By our assumptions on X and Y , κx−κy > 0 and χx > 1/(N−1). If χy > 1/(N−1) then inequality (5) is
satisfied, and so X is selected to replace Y . If χy < 1/(N −1) then, to determine the conditions for which
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X is selected to replace Y we make the coordinate transformation χ∗y = χy − 1N−1 and χ∗x = χx − 1N−1 ,
so that χ∗x > 0 and χ∗y < 0. The inequality (5) is then satisfied provided
−2
(
1− χ∗x −
1
N − 1
)
χ∗y −
(
1− χ∗y −
1
N − 1
)
χ∗x < 0.
Rearranging this gives
χ∗x >
−2
(
1− 1N−1
)
χ∗y(
1− 3χ∗y − 1N−1
)
which is hardest to satisfy when χ∗y is at its minimum, i.e. χ∗y = −1− 1N−1 . This results in the inequality
χx >
N + 1
2N − 1 (6)
as a sufficient condition for X to selectively replace Y . This sufficient condition is met by our assumption
on X. And so non-cooperative ZD strategies can always be selectively replaced, provided N > 2.
Generous strategies limit the difference between their payoff and their opponent’s
payoff
Consider Eq. 2 for a generous ZD strategy Y facing an arbitrary opponent X:
φ [sxy − χsyx − (1− χ)(B − C)] = 0.
Rearranging this expression gives the difference in the players’ payoffs
sxy − syx = (1− χ)((B − C)− syx).
Increasing χ reduces the difference between two players’ payoffs, regardless of the opponent’s strategy.
This is also true for generous good strategies, which satisfy
sxy − syx = (1− χ)((B − C)− syx)− λ(vcd + vdc)
where vcd denotes the equilibrium rate of the play (cd) and vdc the equilibrium rate of the play (dc) [13].
The ability of generous strategies to limit the difference in payoffs with arbitrary opponents accounts for
their remarkable consistency as invaders, as exemplified in Fig. S8. On the other hand, a non-generous
strategy, such as win-stay-lose-shift, is subject to larger differences between her payoff and her opponent’s
payoff, leading to less consistent success as an invader (Fig. S8).
Long-memory strategies
Our results for the evolutionary success of generous strategies in a finite population also hold against
longer-memory opponents. As per Press & Dyson, from the perspective of a memory-1 player, a long-
memory opponent is equivalent to a memory-1 opponent. Thus the payoff sxy can be determined by
considering only the set of memory-1 strategies. However the payoff a long-memory opponent receives
against itself, sxx, may depend on its memory capacity. Nonetheless, under the standard IPD assumption
2R > T + S the highest total payoff for any pair of players in the IPD is 2R; and so sxx ≤ R. This
condition on sxx is the only condition required to derive our results on the robustness of ZD and good
strategies (see Supporting Information), and so our results continue to hold even against long-memory
invaders.
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